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EDUCATION AND THE HUMANITIES 
If education is a means to the end either of knowledge 
or of skill, it is dearly contingent upon a given conception of 
knowledge or skill, and therefore upon the condition of know-
ledge in a given field at a given time. Certainty in what is 
to be taught usually produces certainty in how to teach it; 
conversely, uncertainty in the subject-matter is almost bound 
to produce uncertainty in methods of instruction. It must 
therefore be a matter of serious concern to the humanities 
educator that th_e state of learning in his subject is satisfac-
tory only in its . historical and similar "factual" elements, 
while in any question relating to the natures, powers, and 
values of the objects which are the center of that subject 
and which .give that subject its importance- I mean the 
objects of art_: it is such that one may doubt whether it in-
volves knowle~ge at all. 
For it is natural in our day to test whatever professes 
to be knowledge by comparing it with science; and such 
comparison, in this instance, is not likely to flatter the van-
ity of the humanist. In the sciences, it would seem, theory 
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and practice have gone hand in hand, with the result that 
the projects, and even the fantasies, of one generation appear 
commonplace beside the real achievements of the next. Scien-
tific discourse, despite its remoteness from common speech 
and its unintelligibility to the layman, is a model of clarity, 
uniformity, and precision; failure to understand it is at once 
imputed to lack of training, rather than to any flaw in the 
discussion. Method and principle have been so firmly estab-
lished that in the most abstruse and complicated problems 
many minds arrive independently at the same conclusion, 
and all concur once the proof is shown. The most complex 
cooperation is possible to researchers who have nothing in 
common but their science. Even the predictions and con-
jectures of science are respected because of the foundations 
on which they rest; and it is only in the realm of prediction 
and conjecture that any significant dissension arises among 
scientists. There is agreement as to what is or is not scien-
tific knowledge; at any rate, there is no difficulty as to the 
proper course of study, or as to the qualifications of a scien-
tist. Finally, to cut the list short, science seems to be so 
much a matter of the things studied, rather than of the man 
studying, that it is supposed as independent as possible of the 
individual researcher; its progress is not much impeded by 
the death even of the eminent scientist, who leaves behind 
him knowledge solid as coral, to be built upon by succeding 
generations. 
The state of the arts, considered as departments of 
knowledge, is the very reverse. Contemporary literature 
has not surpassed the work of Homer, Dante, or Shakespeare 
as the jet fighter has surpassed earlier aircraft; contempo-
rary critical and aesthetic theory exhibits no superiority to 
that of the past. The integration of theory with practice is 
minimal; indeed, theory is so general and so uncertain that 
it can offer small, if any, guidance to the practising artist. 
Critical terminology is so ambiguous that perhaps half the 
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critical controversies of today are over words. There is not 
only no agreement upon method, but none even upon the pos-
sibility or impossibility of method. No point of doctrine 
has been advanced which has not been repeatedly and vi-
gorously denied. There is no agreement upon what consti-
tutes critical knowledge, or upon the proper course of study; 
and any evaluation either of critic or critical project is sure 
to provoke sharp controversy. Finally, artistic theory seems 
so muc~ a question of the man studying rather than of the 
things studied that each theory might almost be said to die 
with its author; the extension and even the application of a 
given theory are matters of the greatest uncertainty; rather 
than progress we see difference and change. In short, 
whereas our sciences exhibit all the tokens of knowledge, our 
artistic theories exhibit only those of opinion and taste. 
Such, doubtless, would be the common conclusion after 
the comparison of the arts and the sciences_. Yet the case is 
by no means so simple. The true situation of the humanities, 
I believe, is not so much that we do not know as it is that 
we do not know that we know . It is not that some twenty-
five centuries of inquiry and theorizing have failed to supply 
us with knowledge, but that we have failed to recognize that 
knowledge as knowledge, and ·consequently have failed to pro-
fit by it. Chaotic as the present condition of eriticism and aes-
thetics may seem, it is the result of only a few causes, and 
consideration of these will, I hope, set the whole matter in 
a different light. · These causes are 1) the peculiar nature 
of art as a subject-matter, 2) the relation of art, as know-
ledge, to other sciences, and 3) our general failure to re-
cognize, and hence to interpret properly, certain phenomena 
produced by differences of method. 
One aspect of the peculiarity of art as a subject-matter 
is the difficulty of apprehending the artistic fact. In the 
physical sciences the concrete fact is established by the 
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senses, whether aided or unaided by instruments: the eye 
sees sodium burn upon contact with water, or sees the lit-
mus paper turn from pink to blue, or the needle register 
upon the graph, or the pointer shift upon the dial; however 
different the interpretations of these as data, however dif-
ferent the systems of inference constructed upon these, 
these themselves remain solid, clearly ascertained. The math-
ematical sciences are completely independent of the concrete 
fact; their data lie in their axioms, definitions, and pos-
tulates. But the case of the arts is completely different. All 
objects of art involve primar y sensory presentations, but the 
object itself, as object, 1s not perceptible to sense. Of a paint-
ing the eye sees only certain lines and colors, of a sculpture 
only certain planes and masses; it is not by the faculty of 
sight alone that we determine that the painting depicts a 
face marked by nobility and suffering, or the sculpture, the 
agony of Christ. Similarly in all other arts: acuteness and 
attentiveness of the senses involved are only a small part of 
the whole business of perception of the object. A child or 
youth who can readily learn propositions of mathematics or 
of physics cannot be expected to understand, in any signifi-
cant sense, such poems as Wordsworth's Ode on Intimations 
of Immortality or Yeats' Sailing to Byzantium; he can say 
what the words say, but he cannot perceive what the poem 
is, simply because he lacks sufficient ·experience to make the 
experience depicted in either poem intelligible to him. Nor 
is the experience required for the perception of a work of 
art a matter only of human experience, in the general sense; 
it is also a matter of experience with the forms and devices 
of art. 
The "facts" of art, then, are difficult of apprehension, 
since they depend for their apprehension upon the coexis-
tence and coertion of a number of faculties in a given obser-
ver- faculties, one might go on to say, not always given by 
nature, and not always easy of achievement. What is more, 
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the unqualified observer, who is not in possession of the 
facts is quite likely to mistake such impressions as he does 
have for the facts themselvs. Artistic inquiry is thus lodged 
at the outset in the difficulty that there will be a high varia-
bility in what is taken as fact; but we must not suppose that 
therefore such inquiry cannot be based upon fact, or that 
the facts can never be ascertained. Granted that not every-
one who can read can comprehend poetry, that not all who 
can hear can understand music, that not all who can see can 
· perceive the qualities of a painting or a sculpture, it does 
not in the least follow that perception and comprehension are 
impossible. The work of art is as solid and real an existen-
ce as the natural phenomenon, and its attributes are as de-
t erminate; the business of the aesthetician and critic is to 
ascertain what the work is and what its attributes are. 
But facts alone do not constitute science; they are mere-
ly the raw material of the data upon which a science is 
erected; and a second aspect of the peculiarity of art as a 
subject-matter is that it demands, for scientific formulation, 
that the unusual powers of perception just mentioned be cou-
pled with unusual philosophic proficiency. When .attributes 
are rare in themselves, there coincidence in one individual is 
likely to be rarer still; it is therefore not surprising that the 
aesthetician, trained in the consideration of philosophic theo-
ries of art, has seldom the trained sensitivity required to put 
him in possession of sufficient data, nor that the critic, 
skilled in the scrutiny of particular works, has seldom the 
philosophic discipline required for the construction of sound 
theory, or even for the conversion of fact into datum. Yet, 
if the aesthetician has been too general and the critic too 
· particular, it does not follow that art is inamenable to scien-
t ific inquiry, but that humanistic education has been at fault: 
the aesthetician should have had rigorous training in the 
examination of individual works, and the critic should have 
been train.ed in philosophic method. 
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A third aspect of the subject, perhaps the one most 
I i k e I y to seem to render it insusceptible of scientific 
treatment, is its apparent lack of scientific "laws". All 
science, it may be argued, depends upon some supposition of 
constancy; for example, the natural sciences depend upon the 
supposition of constancy in nature; what would be the point 
of inquiring into the force of gravitation or the speed of 
light, if the force of gravitation could be brought under no 
constant formula, or if light had no fixed speed? On these 
grounds, what possible constancy can be found in art? Hy-
drogen explodes under . certain conditions, and anyone who 
fulfills those conditions, animal or man, willingly or un-
willingly, will explode it; but whether a tragedy will turn out 
excellent, or turn out to be a tragedy at all, is entirely de-
pendent upon the skill and genius of the poet; the forms of 
individual works of art are never predictable from an inspec-
tion of their medium; the very painter who produced a good 
painting last month now produces one which is bad; and so 
on. On the contrary, art is always individual; an individual 
work is produced by an individual artist; and of the indivi-
dual there is no science. 
This line of argument was sufficiently plausible to in-
duce a gifted and intelligent American poet to bid farewell 
to criticism, some years ago; but it is plausible rather than 
sound. The argument amounts, to this statement merely, 
that there is no necessity in art; and this statement is false. 
The artist need not have theoretical knowledge, true; the 
creative process is wrapped in mystery, and perhaps insolu-
ble mystery- true also; and true that the form cannot be 
predicted from the materials, and that the reaction of the 
audience and the value of the work, and much else as well, 
are also unpredictable in any particular instance. But all 
this is really beside the point: the crux of the argument is 
whether, because a work of art is always an individual thing, 
it is absolutely unique, or not. If it is absolutely unique, in . 
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~ ~he sense that no proposition which is true of a given work 
is true of any other, there is no possibility of scientific know-
ledge of art; but if on the other hand it is not absolutely 
unique, and if the propositions which apply to two or more 
works can be shown to deal with them essentially as art, the 
possibility of knowledge is clear. 
Now I doubt whether anyone can really hold the posi-
tion that a proposition which is true of any orie work is false 
of all others; and I am even more doubtful whether any 
evidence could be found to support such a position. For the 
facts run too clearly otherwise. If this position is true, how 
do we recognize music as music, painting as painting, poetry 
as poetry? How, indeed, do we recognize art as art at all? 
Again, we think that there is such a thing as skill in art; 
but could there possibly be a skill with respect to absolutely 
inassociable particulars? The slightest reflection will show 
us that indeed objects of art, even generally considered, have 
much more in common than not. Every artist uses a cer-
tain medium, words, tones, rhythms, line, color, mass; and 
every medium has its definite powers and limitations.; for 
example, musical tones cannot depict a face as line and col-
or can, for the simple reason that tones have no position in 
space; and if the use of a medium is an element in the pro-
duction of art, it follows that good art will involve a proper 
use of the medium, and that bad use will produce bad art; 
and if so, there is clearly a field of inquiry which must apply 
to all individual works utilizing a given medium. But more: 
the artist does not merely use a medium, but achieves a cer-
tain form by its use; mere line and color do not constitute a 
painting, nor mere tones music. Now, no form in any one 
art is the same as a form in any other; there are therefore 
considerations of form essential to music as music, painting 
as painting, poetry as poetry, which must again apply to all 
the individual works within a given art. This latter area 
of inquiry is indeed the starting-point of all the "laws" or 
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necessary propositions of art: if a certain form is to be 
achieved, a certain whole to be produced, then such and such 
parts will have to be assembled in such and such ways, and 
the medium will have to be employed in such and such a 
fashion. The artist may not choose to achieve a certain form; 
but some form he must achieve, and whatever it may be, he .· 
is bound by it ; unless he does what the form requires, he 
will fail. He may not wish to compose a classical tragedy; 
but if he does wish to, he will have to compose a tragedy 
such as Aristotle described. 
But, some one may object, if art is thus clearly a field 
for scientific inquiry - for this is what your argument 
amounts to - why has the development of theory in art 
not kept pace with that of theory in science? I must admit 
that it has not; and has not for several reasons. In the first 
place, evolution in art has generally happened much more 
rapidly than in nature; the result is that we are confronted 
with innumerable, and appar ently quite ephemeral, forms 
- a fact which immensely complicates the business of clas-
sification and analysis. Secondly, certain human tendencies 
have operated to produce, not so much premature theory, 
as premature rejection of theories, and thus produced appar-
ent disorder. Chief among these are the tendency to re-
gard art as finite and completely developed, whereas, like · 
all that depends upon human invention, it is really capable 
of indefinite development; the tendency to suppose that even 
sound theoretical bases are nullified by the emergence of 
new forms and devices; the tendency to suppose that theory 
need not expand with art; the tendency to ignore differen-
ces of kind and function among art forms; and specially the 
tendency to confuse validity with universality, and hence to 
insist that a principle must be universally and absolutely 
true because it is true speCifically and conditionally, or con-
versely to insist that a principle is utterly false because it 
is not true universally and absolutely. 
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The chief reason, however, is that certain sciences which 
are of the utmost importance to t he proper development of 
artistic inquiry have not developed themselves to such a de-
gree, or at any rate, in such a way, as to afford art the ins-
truments it requires. Most important of these, I should say, 
is psychology; for every work of art is governed by the effect 
which it is to produce, and this is in every instance a psy-
chological effect. Had psychology developed a clear and 
well-integrated theory of the emotions, following, let us say, 
the lines either of Spinoza or Locke or Hume, all of whom 
differentiated and analyzed the causes of many kinds of emo-
tions, the influence of this upon critical development would 
have been enormous. As the matter stands, the use of Freu-
dian, Jungian, and other contemporary theories in artistic 
·inquiry, particular or general, has produced nothing which 
I should consider valuable, and a great deal which I should 
consider trash. 
The primary cause of confusion and uncert ainty in the 
theory of art, however, is neither the peculiarity of the sub-
ject-matter nor the relation of art to other sciences, but the 
third factor I have mentioned: our failure to comprehend cer-
tain phenomena of method. Here the fact is plain: critical 
theory has developed an astounding number of very diverse 
methods, and we tend to interpret that diversity as contra-
diction. Theories of art are always part of actual or po-
tential philosophic systems: an Aristotelian system produces 
an Aristotelian theory of art, a Humeian system a Humeian 
theory of art, a Kantian system, a Kantian; conversely, exam-
ination into any systematic theory of art, or of criticism, 
will carry us into philosophic assumptions upon which the 
theory rests. We do not take matters of method sufficiently 
into account either in philosophy or in science; we speak 
glibly about philosophic or scient ific knowledge as concerned 
with the natures of things, ignoring that what we call know-
ledge and science is as much a function of our modes of 
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thought and expression as of the natures of the things we 
seek to conceive and express. A scientific conception is not 
the resultant simply of the thing conceived, but also of the 
manner of conception; a scientific statement is the resultant 
not merely of the conception, but also of the manner of ex-
pression. What may we know of a given subject, whatever . 
it may be? Only such of it as we may conceive. What 
may we express of what we conceive? Only so much of it 
as we can express. But then much of the subject rr.ust es- · 
cape our conception, and much of the conception must escape 
our expression. We tend to fail to observe this, or to dis- · 
regard it if we do observe it; we equate statement with 
conception, and conception with thing conceived, as readily 
as we equate what we see of a thing with what there is to 
be seen of it, although we know that the image is the prod-
uct not only of the thing seen but of the seeing eye. 
Language and thought are both selective, that is, cannot 
deal with the whole of the subject with which they propose 
to deal; what is more, they are restrictive, that is, once they 
have made their selection, they are bound by it. Thus any 
philosophic problem is relative to its formulation; and since 
any solution to a philosophic problem is relative to that pro-
blem, any solution is relative also to the formulation of that 
problem. Any philosopher, consequently, though he profess 
to talk about the universe, can really talk about that universe 
only as it is formulated in his discourse; and his whole 
philosophy, insofar as it is consistent, is a function of the 
kind of dialectic he exerts upon so much of the subject as . 
he has been able to isolate. Sufficient understanding of this 
point carries with it the conviction that no one philosophy 
can be all - sufficient, and the further conviction of the pos-
sibility of many valid philosophies. The humanist who 
attempts to understand aesthetic and critical H1eory in terms . .. 
of differences of philosophic method will soon reject the no-
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tion that such theory is a mere whirligig of taste, or that 
contemporary criticism is a mere arena of contending opin-
ions. 
The state of affairs, then, in aesthetics and criticism, 
is that the subject is perfectly susceptible of scientific treat-
ment; that progress in it is necessarily dependent upon the 
developm,ent of certain sciences such as psychology which 
it needs as instruments; and that disciplines such as philo-
sophic methodology and dialectic are requisite to demon-
strate that the apparent disorder is only diversity, and to ex-
hibit the powers and limitations of the various methods. If 
so, the course of education is perfectly clear. Since the sub-
ject is capable of being brought to a scientific condition, it 
· should be brought to it; and this is likely to happen only if 
the effort is made to produce students equally skilled in the 
perception of art and in the theoretic disciplines. Logic, 
dialectic, and the study of philosophic and scientific method 
must form part of the artistic curriculum, and be as closely 
integrated as possible with the study of the arts themselves. 
The history of philosophy must be studied side by side with 
the history of the arts, and with the history of the theory 
and criticism of the arts; and sciences which are instrumental 
must be studied as well, and brought to the point where 
they are instrumental to some purpose. It is thus, and per-
haps only thus, that humanistic studies will regain their 
ancient pr.estige as the body of studies primarily respon-
sible for what we call culture in man. 
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